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Abstract
As the world’s population of elderly persons rises (He, Goodkind, & Kowal, 2016), there is an
increasing demand for people to care for the elderly. Caregiving robots are a potential solution to
this problem. Research (i.e. MacDorman, 2005) suggests that uncanny, humanlike robots may
elicit death anxiety, but it remains unclear whether non-humanlike caregiving robots also elicit
death anxiety. This study expands on MacDorman’s study and investigates the effects of
caregiving robots on death thought accessibility (DTA) and death anxiety in the institutionalized
elderly. This research focuses on how caregiving robots affect the close relationship buffer
against death anxiety, as well as looking at self-esteem and locus of control as potential
covariates of DTA and death anxiety. A video of a non-humanlike caregiving robot as a
mortality salience induction and a video of a human caregiver as a control video are used as
stimuli. The results showed no significant differences in death anxiety and DTA between the
human and robot caregivers. There were no interactions involving self-esteem and locus of
control. Implications are discussed.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
What was once the subject of science fiction horror may soon be coming to a household
near you. Although the implications of care and companion robots have been explored in works
such as E.T.A. Hoffmann’s The Sandman (1816) and Ira Levin’s The Stepford Wives (1972), the
recent advancement of robots as potential caregivers and companions suggests an increased need
for attention from the scientific community. Robots as companions or caregivers may someday
be commonplace in many households, but perhaps the most imminent use is to care for the
elderly. With advancements in technology and medicine, people can live longer than ever before.
By 2050, 17% of the world’s population (nearly 1.6 billion people) will be age 65 or older
compared to 8.5% of people today (617 million people) (He et al., 2016). This dramatic increase
is likely to present new challenges for healthcare industries and communities as the demand for
people to care for the elderly increases. With falling global fertility rates (He et al., 2016), the
number of children being born is declining, and for the first time in history, people age 65 and
older outnumber children under age 5 (and by 2050, it is estimated that the elderly will more than
double the number of children under age 5) (He et al., 2016). The aging population faces the
challenge of who will help care for them as fertility rates decline worldwide (UN Population
Division, 2017) as fewer and fewer young people are available to care for an increasingly elderly
population.
The field of robotics offers a potential solution to this problem; robots can be the new
caregivers for this population. Given the novelty of using robots as caregivers, there are still
many questions left to be answered regarding the psychological and ethical implications of
caregiving robots. Robots designed to care for people or otherwise work in a domestic setting fall
under the category of ‘social robots.’ Social robots are generally defined as robots that elicit
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social responses from their human users because they follow the rules of behavior expected by
their human users (de Graaf et al., 2016; Bartneck & Forlizzi, 2004). Compared to robots that do
not work in domestic and social settings, the design of social robots is especially important when
considering how these robots interact with those that use them. Prior research indicates that
people can establish some kind of emotional or social bond with socially interactive robots (de
Graaf et al., 2016). Humans are easily able to bond with nonhuman objects because of a
fundamental ‘need to belong’ that induces a desire for relationships with other social beings
(Cacioppo & Patrick, 2008). This desire to form relationships with nonhuman objects is likely to
increase when these objects possess lifelike abilities and are endowed with humanlike capacities
(de Graaf et al., 2016). For these reasons, people who use and interact with social robots often
become attached to them, the same way one might become attached to a significant other,
caregiver, or friend.
Countries that are especially susceptible to the consequences of an aging population and
declining fertility rates are setting the groundwork for the use of social robots in caregiving roles.
As of 2015, Japan had the highest percentage of the population age 65 and older (approximately
26.6%) (He et al., 2016) and has projected a shortfall of 380,000 specialized workers to care for
the elderly by 2025 (Foster, 2018). Though other countries, such as the United States, are
implementing social robots in caregiving roles, Japan has most notably been implementing the
use of this technology (Petrecca, 2018). In Japan, robots are being used in elder care facilities to
support staff and provide companionship to the elderly (Foster, 2018). The three main ways in
which robots might be used in elder care are: (1) to assist the elderly, and/or their caretakers in
daily tasks; (2) to help monitor their behavior and health; and (3) to provide companionship
(Sharkey, 2010). This thesis will primarily focus on the use of robots as companions and
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caregivers, as opposed to robots whose primary function is to monitor patients’ health. As robots
take over the traditionally human roles of companionship and caregiving, it is important to
consider the psychological relationship between the nonhuman robot and the person for whom it
cares for.
Although caregiving robots may be more efficient than traditional methods of caregiving
(i.e. human caregivers), research suggests that the use of these robots may negatively impact the
well-being of those in need of care. The primary cause for concern about using these social
robots in caregiving settings lies in existential psychology research. Existential psychology is a
branch of social psychology that studies how humans cope with the omnipresent reality of death
and dying (Pyszczynski et al., 2004). Terror Management Theory (TMT) lies within existential
psychology and posits that certain behaviors help manage this death anxiety (Rosenblatt et al.,
1989). TMT examines how different aspects of the human experience may affect existential
concerns (Rosenblatt et al., 1989). Death anxiety can generally be defined as the fear of and
anxiety related to the anticipation and awareness of the reality of dying and death (Lehto &
Stein, 2009). A handful of studies that employ TMT methods indicate that robots may affect
death anxiety and that those most likely to use these social robots (e.g. elderly persons) may
already be at risk for higher levels of death anxiety. For example, one study suggests that
humanlike robots may increase the anxiety one feels about his or her death (MacDorman, 2005).
Research indicates that elderly people traditionally have less death anxiety compared to younger
adults (Sinoff, 2017), but that elderly people in institutional settings (i.e. those who are most
likely to one day use a social robot) tend to have higher levels of death anxiety compared to
those living in their community (Azaiza et al., 2010; Missler et al., 2012). This is likely because
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those living in institutional settings have decreased levels of social support, which has been
shown to help manage existential concerns (Mikulincer et al., 2002).
If the psychological effects of using robots do more harm to the overall well-being of
patients than good, then their use should be discontinued because they are creating the opposite
effect they are trying to produce. Furthermore, if research identifies certain aspects of robots that
are significantly harmful to patients, then it may be possible to adjust the robots accordingly
without discontinuing their use outright. Research on the specific ways in which caregiving
robots might affect the elderly allows for a better understanding of how we might design future
robots to best help populations in need of care and what kinds of roles robots ought to fill in
peoples’ lives.
The following chapters explore this topic further. Chapter 2 provides more information
on Terror Management Theory, focusing on death anxiety in the elderly, past research on robots
and their influence on death salience, and outlines the goals and hypotheses of the thesis. Chapter
3 outlines the methods used, including details about participants, materials, and the procedure.
Chapter 4 reports the findings of the thesis, and finally, Chapter 5 discusses the conclusions of
the thesis, limitations, theoretical implications, and directions for future research.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
This chapter provides an in-depth literature review of past research. This chapter begins
with an overview of Terror Management Theory (TMT), which is the primary theory used in this
thesis’s investigation of the psychological effects of caregiving robots. Next, this chapter gives
more information about the relationship between the elderly and death anxiety. In particular, this
section covers various factors influencing death anxiety in the elderly, such as physical health,
religiosity, and institutionalization. The chapter then discusses MacDorman’s (2005) flagship
study on robots, death salience, and the uncanny valley while discussing additional research on
robots and social connection. Finally, the chapter explains the goals of the thesis and lists the
hypotheses.
Terror Management Theory
Terror Management Theory (TMT) falls under the domain of existential psychology, a
subfield of social psychology that speculates about how humans confront and come to terms with
the nature of existence and the meaning of life (Greenberg et al., 1986). Before the development
of TMT and existential psychology in the 1980s, social psychology seldom focused on the role
death played in one’s everyday life. Contrary to the field of social psychology at the time, TMT
offered a new perspective on existential questions—the inevitability of death has a profound
effect on many domains of human behavior (Darrell & Pyszczynski, 2016).
TMT is derived from the work of cultural anthropologist Ernest Becker, who in his book,
The Denial of Death, noted an important paradox in humans: humans are the only species to
have both an awareness of the inevitability of death and a fundamental desire for survival and
life (Becker, 1973). According to Becker (1973), this awareness of death leads to an omnipresent
fear of death that must be overcome if humans are to function normally. Becker, and
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consequently TMT, posit that humans overcome this omnipresent fear of death by adhering to a
cultural worldview. Culture provides both a ‘literal immortality’ and a ‘symbolic immortality’
that allow for the belief that human existence is meaningful and unending (Dechesne et al.,
2003). ‘Literal immortality’ refers to the belief in an afterlife promised by many organized
religions, whereas ‘symbolic immortality’ refers to the idea that culture endures past a lifetime,
and that by becoming part of one’s culture, one symbolically lives on after death (Dechesne et
al., 2003). Thus, if someone adheres to the standards of a cultural worldview, they can overcome
the paralyzing realities of death (Solomon et al., 2004). In addition to one’s cultural worldview,
TMT stresses the importance of self-esteem in overcoming a fear of death. According to TMT,
self-esteem is the belief that one is a person of value in a world of meaning (where this meaning
comes from the standards of value prescribed by one’s culture) (Greenberg et al., 1986).
Adhering to the standard set forth by one’s culture increases self-esteem, and thus self-esteem
acts as a buffer against death anxiety (Rosenblatt et al., 1989). At the forefront of the empirical
assessments of TMT is the mortality salience hypothesis and the anxiety buffer hypothesis.
Mortality Salience Hypothesis
The mortality salience hypothesis suggests if one’s cultural worldview and self-esteem
act as psychological structures that provide protection against death anxiety, then reminding
people of their mortality (mortality salience; MS) should increase a need for these psychological
structures (Pyszczynski et al., 1997; Solomon et al., 2004). In one notable study, participants in
the MS condition (i.e. people who were reminded of their death) were more likely to judge moral
transgressors (i.e. challengers of the participants’ cultural worldviews) more harshly compared to
participants in the control condition (Rosenblatt, et al., 1989). In another study, Christian
participants in the MS condition reported more positive evaluations of a Christian (in-group)
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target and more negative evaluations of a Jewish (out-group) target, while participants in the
control condition reported no significant differences in their evaluation of the Christian and
Jewish target (Greenberg et al., 1990). This propensity to respond positively toward that which
upholds one’s cultural values and to respond especially negatively to that which violates one’s
cultural values is known as ‘worldview defense’ (Rosenblatt et al., 1989). Further experiments
suggest that worldview defense in response to MS is not mediated by physiological arousal,
anxiety, or mood (Rosenblatt et al., 1989). This discovery gives additional support to the MS
hypothesis since it suggests that thinking about one’s death, as opposed to other psychological
factors such as arousal, is responsible for an increased worldview defense. These studies, along
with an additional 160 published studies on MS (Solomon et al., 2004), have played a crucial
role in establishing the MS hypothesis as an empirically valid component of TMT.
Proximal and Distal Defenses
In addition to creating a theoretical framework for why people experience death-related
anxieties, TMT explains certain behaviors and attitudes observed after a MS induction. In
response to a MS induction, people respond by engaging in proximal and distal defenses.
Proximal defenses involve mostly rational and cognitive defense mechanisms in an attempt to
push conscious death-related thoughts out of consciousness (Pyszczynski et al., 1999). For
example, attempting to distract oneself from the death-related thoughts or denying one’s
apparent vulnerability of dying (e.g. “I’m only 20, young people hardly ever die) are proximal
defense mechanisms. Since the primary purpose of a proximal defense is to remove death from
conscious awareness, these defenses occur immediately after MS, and then subside (Darrell &
Pyszczynski, 2016). Whereas proximal defenses help to eliminate conscious thoughts of death,
distal defenses help to eliminate subconscious thoughts of death. Research indicates that people
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engage in these distal defenses only when death-related thoughts are pushed below conscious
awareness (Pyszczynski et al., 2000). Immediately after the MS induction, proximal defenses are
activated to push thoughts of death out of consciousness (Pyszczynski et al., 2000). After a
delay, death thoughts are out of consciousness but still highly accessible. Distal defenses are then
enacted and address the death-related thoughts indirectly and symbolically, thus creating the
effect that one is a contributor to a meaningful and eternal universe (Pyszczynski et al., 1999).
These indirect, distal defenses occur after a delay (i.e. when death-related thoughts are no longer
in conscious awareness but remain subconsciously active) (Greenberg et al., 1994). Adherence to
one’s cultural worldview, maintaining self-esteem, and engaging in close relationships with
others are all ways in which people engage in distal defenses, and thus attempt to keep
omnipresent fears of death out of conscious awareness.
Anxiety Buffer Hypothesis
Another fundamental hypothesis in TMT is the anxiety buffer hypothesis. This hypothesis
states that if a psychological structure protects against anxiety (particularly death-related
anxiety), then strengthening that structure should lead to decreased anxiety while weakening that
structure should lead to increased anxiety (Greenberg et al., 1986). The three primary structures
that serve as a buffer against death anxiety are adherence to one’s cultural worldview, selfesteem, and close relationships (Darrell & Pyszczynski, 2016). In their important study,
Schmeichel and Martens (2005) found that participants in the MS condition who had first
affirmed an important self-value evaluated a worldview violator less harshly compared to
participants in the MS condition who had not first affirmed an important value. The study also
found that those in the value-affirmation condition had significantly less death anxiety compared
to those who had not affirmed a value, suggesting that adhering to one’s cultural worldviews can
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serve as a potential buffer against death anxiety. Another study (Greenberg et al., 1992) showed
that participants who received positive feedback on a personality test (i.e. received a self-esteem
boost) prior to watching a video with death-related scenes reported less anxiety than participants
who received neutral personality feedback before watching the video.
The last structure that serves as a buffer against death anxiety is close relationships with
others. Prior psychological research proposes that close relationships play a crucial role in
regulating distress (Bowlby, 1969) and are an important source of self-esteem (Leary, 1999;
Leary & Downs, 1995). Florian et al. (2002) hypothesized that since close relationships help
alleviate anxiety and boost self-esteem (which is itself a death anxiety buffer), close
interpersonal relationships may also serve as a death anxiety buffer. In support of their
hypothesis, a series of studies found that increasing mortality salience resulted in higher reports
of romantic commitment, thinking about romantic commitment reduced the effects of MS when
participants were asked to judge social wrongdoers, and being promoted to think about problems
in romantic relationships led to higher accessibility of death-related thoughts compared to a
control group (Florian et al., 2002). These results indicate that close relationships play a crucial
role in reducing death anxiety. The present thesis aims to explore what role social robots play in
the close-relationship buffer against anxiety, and a more complete literature review of social
connections as a buffer against death anxiety will be conducted in ensuing pages.
Death Anxiety in the Elderly
Although the effects of thinking about death are relevant across all age demographics,
studying how older adults (who are statistically speaking, closer to death) is of particular interest
to many TMT researchers. In addition to being “closer” to death, the elderly face additional
challenges, such as being institutionalized, that are less prevalent for younger adults (Fortner &
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Neimeyer, 1999). Studying how the elderly experience death anxiety is especially important
when considering therapeutic, institutional, and healthcare practices.
Empirical research on the death attitudes of older adults first began in the 1950s with the
work of Herman Feifel (Neimeyer et al., 2003). Feifel (1956) found that older American veterans
of World War I reported only thinking of death occasionally or rarely and displayed less fear of
death than middle-aged or young adults (Feifel & Branscomb, 1973). Interestingly, even though
participants in this study showed less fear of death, the participants still believed that fear of
death peaks in old age when asked to describe when “people in general” fear death (Feifel,
1956). Contrary to what one might intuitively theorize about older adults and death anxiety,
Feifel’s research, along with many more recent studies, has generally found that death anxiety is
lower in older adults, and that death anxiety decreases from middle to old age (e.g. Fornter &
Neimeyer, 1999; Bengtson et al., 1977; Neimeyer, Wittkowski, & Moser, 2003). Despite this
overarching trend for the elderly to experience reduced death anxiety, some studies indicate that
the relationship between age and death anxiety is not strictly linear. For example, Gesser and
colleagues (1997-1988) observed that older adults had a lower fear of death compared to middleaged adults, but not young adults. Furthermore, there may be differences in what exactly about
death and dying is precipitating death anxiety in younger versus older adults. Thorson and
Powell (1994) found that younger adults had more fear surrounding decomposition, immobility,
pain, uncertainty, helplessness, and isolation, whereas older adults had more fear surrounding the
loss of control and the existence of the afterlife.
It is also important to note that elderly persons of different ethnicities may vary in their
fears of death. Depaola and colleagues (2003) found that elderly White participants displayed a
higher fear of dying compared to elderly Black participants. When looking at more specific
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constructs of fear of death, Black participants displayed higher levels of fear of the unknown,
fear of conscious death, and fear for the body after death, while also placing less social value on
the elderly compared to White participants (Depaola et al., 2003). This study, along with the fact
that the majority of research on death and the elderly has focused on Western, Christian
populations (Azaiza et al., 2010), suggests that future research ought to look at the fear of death
in the elderly across different cultures and races.
Confounding Variables in Death Anxiety and the Elderly
Age alone is not sufficient for predicting death anxiety, and multiple factors play a role in
one’s level of death anxiety. In their meta-analysis of death attitudes in older adults, Fortner and
Neimeyer (1999) identified ego integrity, physical health problems, psychological problems,
religiosity, and institutionalization as factors that affect death anxiety in older adults.
Erik Erikson, who is best known for his theory of psychosocial development, noted eight
distinct developmental stages a person goes through throughout his or her life. In each stage, a
person encounters a different psychosocial crisis (i.e. when the individual’s needs conflict with
society) that must be resolved if the person is to continue developing normally (Erikson, 1963,
1982). In middle age (approximately 40 to 65 years), an individual goes through the
“generativity versus stagnation stage” in which people experience a need to create or nurture
things that will outlive them (McLeod, 2018). Erikson predicted that it is an awareness of one’s
death that triggers this stage (Erikson, 1963, 1982), and successive research on the relationship
between age and death awareness (as noted in the aforementioned studies) appears to support
Erikson’s prediction. The next and final stage of psychosocial development, ego integrity versus
despair, involves contemplating life’s accomplishments. If an individual successfully goes
through this stage, they experience heightened “ego integrity” which involves acceptance of
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one’s life and a sense of wholeness. Failure in this stage results in despair, depression, and
hopelessness (McLeod, 2018) while successful resolution of this stage (i.e. increased ego
integrity) is negatively correlated with death anxiety (Fortner & Neimeyer, 1999).
Research points towards a complicated relationship between physical health problems
and death anxiety in the elderly. In their meta-analysis, Fortner and Neimeyer (1999) noted that
greater physical health problems predict higher levels of death anxiety in the elderly. Fortner and
Neimeyer (1999) hypothesized that those who suffer from illness may be closer to death, thus
precipitating increased thoughts of death. Fortner and Neimeyer (1999) used only global
measures of physical health problems in their review, which begs the question that the specific
type of illness might moderate death anxiety in elderly patients (i.e. illness that is terminal or
causes chronic pain). However, another study found there was no difference in levels of death
anxiety among terminally ill heart disease and cancer patients (Feifel et al., 1973). Interestingly,
while terminally ill elderly patients do not display significantly more death anxiety on a
conscious level compared to controls, they do display significantly increased death anxiety on
the non-conscious level (Feifel et al., 1973). This may indicate that elderly persons enact distal
defense, rather than proximal defenses, against death anxiety related to their terminal illness.
Similarly, elderly patients with more psychological problems (at least when looking at global
measures of psychological problems and global measures of depression and anxiety) tend to
show higher levels of death anxiety (Fortner & Neimeyer, 1999).
Religiosity also appears to have a complicated relationship with death anxiety and the
elderly. Although early studies on this relationship indicate that religious people are more afraid
of death than nonreligious people due to the cessation of earthly experience and concerns about
the afterlife (Feifel, 1959), more recent research yields contradictory results (e.g. Feifel &
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Brascomb, 1973; Feifel, 1974, Azaiza et al., 2010). Differences in findings seem to reflect
variations in how religiosity is measured and much of the later research looks at how intrinsic
religiosity versus extrinsic religiosity relates to death anxiety. Intrinsic religiosity involves the
centrality of religious faith in one’s life, whereas extrinsic religiosity reflects a more utilitarian
view of religion (Neimeyer et al., 2003). One study found that only intrinsic religiosity and age is
negatively correlated with death anxiety (Thorson & Powell, 1990), and another study found that
fear of death was negatively correlated with intrinsic religiosity, but positively correlated with
extrinsic religiosity (Bivens et al., 1995). Some researchers have theorized that a more genuine
religious commitment (i.e. the kind of commitment found in intrinsic religiosity) mediates fear of
death by giving meaning to a transcendent afterlife (Rigdon & Epting, 1985).
Finally, institutionalization appears to have the greatest impact on death anxiety for the
elderly and is especially important for the present thesis, since caregiving robots are most likely
to be used in institutionalized settings. Institutionalized elderly people (including those living in
nursing homes, hospices, and other kinds of long-term institutionalization) are typically frailer,
more likely to be surrounded by other elderly people, and are more likely to be confronted with
death and dying than noninstitutionalized elderly people (Azaiza et al., 2010). With these factors
in mind, it makes sense that death is more salient for the elderly in institutionalized settings. Not
much research has been done comparing death anxiety for institutionalized and
noninstitutionalized elderly persons, although the few studies that have looked at this
relationship found that elderly persons in institutionalized settings have a high risk for death
anxiety. Caregiving robots may exacerbate this death anxiety for institutionalized elderly since
research suggests that robots may elicit death anxiety (e.g. MacDorman, 2005), and caregiving
robots may not be able to stand in for the close relationship buffer against death anxiety.
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In a study of elderly Arab Muslims in Israel, Azaiza et al. (2010), nursing home residents
showed higher death anxiety than community residents, although the two groups did not show
any significant difference in dying anxiety compared to community residents. The researchers
note that this may be due to low rates of institutionalization in Arab societies, so people are more
used to experiencing ill people in the community, as well as elderly institutionalized people
thinking of the dying process as an extension of the challenges they already face (Azaiza et al.,
2010). This study also observed that being female and having no education were predictors of
higher death anxiety, whereas higher levels of social support and self-esteem were predictors of
lower death anxiety. However, social support and self-esteem were only negatively correlated
with death anxiety for those in institutionalized settings and not for those living in the
community. Those living in their community, even when they are ill, are more likely to have an
extensive support network, whereas those living in an elder care facility may lack this social
support. In contrast to this study, Moreno et al. (2008) conducted a study of elderly persons in
Spain and found lower death anxiety of those living in institutions compared to those that lived
in their community. In their review, Missler et al. (2012) noted that this difference could be due
to Moreno et al.’s (2012) failure to account for age as a confounding variable. In Moreno et al.’s
samples, the elderly in care institutions were noticeably older (M=83.28, SD=6.72) than those
living in the community (M=70.65, SD=6.00). As previously noted, death anxiety tends to
decrease with age (e.g. Forntner & Neimeyer, 1999), which could explain the difference in
results between Azaiza et al. (2010) and Moreno et al. (2008). In light of these studies and the
apparent lack of research in this area, Missler et al. (2012) employed a multidimensional
approach (i.e. fear for significant others, fear of the dying process, and fear of the unknown were
separate constructs) to death anxiety and identified recent loss of a significant other, social
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support, purpose in life, physical and mental health, and self-esteem as potential correlates of
death anxiety of institutionalized elderly persons in the Netherlands. Like other research, Missler
et al. (2012) found that elderly persons in care institutions scored higher on all the death anxiety
subscales compared to the noninstitutionalized elderly persons in Cicirelli’s (2001) similar study.
Fear for significant others was correlated with worse physical health, and fear of the unknown
was correlated with low self-esteem, possibly due to uncertainty surrounding resources or coping
mechanisms. Fear of the dying process was correlated with low self-esteem, lower senses of
purpose in life, and worse physical health. These results indicate that death anxiety is a complex,
multidimensional construct and that higher death anxiety appears to be correlated with frailty
(Missler et al., 2012). Overall, the study found no significant differences in gender on death
anxiety, although women showed higher levels of fear for significant others.
Undoubtedly, the relationship between death anxiety and older adults is complicated and
multidimensional. Despite the apparent murkiness of past research on this subject, some general
conclusions regarding this relationship can be made. Compared to young and middle-aged adults,
older adults tend to show decreased death anxiety, likely due to an acceptance of their mortality.
Despite this decrease in death anxiety as one ages, it is crucial to note that the elderly living in
institutionalized settings are likely to experience higher levels of death anxiety compared to their
elderly counterparts living alone in the community or with their families. Institutionalization is
generally associated with increased physical and mental health problems, as well as a decreased
social network and lowered self-esteem, meaning that these elderly persons are most at risk for
death anxiety. A better understanding of how and why elderly people experience death anxiety is
crucial for improving the quality of life for this subset of the population.
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Robots and Their Influence on Death Salience
This thesis seeks to expand on the handful of studies that propose robots may elicit death
anxiety and the call that the use of robots in social settings ought to be thoroughly investigated,
especially if research suggests that robots are psychologically harmful to those that use them.
Although many studies have sought to examine the psychological and social effects of robots
through a variety of perspectives, only a handful of studies have sought to examine the
psychological implications of robots through a TMT perspective.
Robots, the Uncanny Valley, and Death Salience
Perhaps the most notable TMT robot study is one conducted by MacDorman (2005). In
this study, MacDorman investigates potential explanations for the ‘uncanny valley.’ Though the
uncanny valley has now become commonplace when discussing humanlike robots and computer
animation, the term was originally proposed by Masahiro Mori in 1970 to explain people’s
reactions to robots that appeared and acted almost human (MacDorman & Kageki, 2012). In his
essay, Mori proposed that as robots appear more and more human, the perceiver’s affinity for
them increases until we reach a valley where the perceiver experiences an eerie, uncanny
sensation when viewing the humanlike robot (Mori, 1970). In his later study, MacDorman gives
one explanation for the eeriness felt as robots approach human likeness yet fail to appear
completely human: humanlike robots act as a reminder of our mortality (MacDorman, 2005).
The study hypothesized that humanlike robots (which the study refers to as ‘androids’)
may look like dead humans, which subliminally remind the perceiver that they will also someday
be dead (MacDorman, 2005). The study predicted that viewing humanlike robots would result in
the distal defense of showing an increased preference for stimuli that support the person’s
worldview and decreased support for stimuli that threaten the person’s worldview (MacDorman,
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2005). That is, the humanlike robot with an uncanny appearance elicits the same distal defenses
as other reminders of death do (MacDorman, 2005). Participants were randomly assigned to
view either an uncanny picture of a female humanlike or a picture of a young human female, and
each picture was then followed by three ‘neutral’ pictures (MacDorman, 2005). Next,
participants were asked a series of questions that served as a delay and then read passages
describing either charismatic or relationship-oriented political candidates as well as passages
describing a foreign student’s experience that either praised or criticized the participant’s home
country. Finally, participants were asked to complete word completions, in which some of the
word completion puzzles were intended to detect any subconscious activation of death (e.g. SK-L, SKULL) or any subconscious activation of uncanniness (e.g. WEI--, WEIRD) (MacDorman,
2005). The results showed that the experimental group showed a statistically significant
preference for worldview supporters (i.e. the charismatic candidate and foreign student that gave
praise) and against worldview threats (i.e. the foreign student who gave criticism) (MacDorman,
2005). Note that this result was only significant when all of the worldview questions were
summed together, but no single question showed strong significance. For the word completion
task, there was a statistically significant increase in the amount of uncanny and uncanny plus
death-related words for the experimental condition compared to the control condition, but no
significant difference for death words alone. While the study indicates that humanlike robots
elicit distal defenses against death anxiety, it remains unclear whether it is the uncanniness of the
robot or other factors (such as a fear of being replaced) that generates death anxiety. It is also
unclear whether non-humanlike robots can also serve as reminders of death, or if this
phenomenon is limited only to humanlike, uncanny robots. Another study attempted to
empirically reproduce Mori’s uncanny valley and found that there is indeed an observable
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‘valley’ of eeriness and strangeness for humanlike robots (MacDorman & Ishiguro, 2006). This
study gradually morphed together an image of a non-humanlike, mechanical robot with an image
of a human, with the intersection between the two images (i.e. halfway between mechanical
robot and human) being the uncanniest. This suggests that more mechanical, non-humanlike
robots are not typically perceived with the same eeriness compared to humanlike robots;
however, since MacDorman’s 2005 study only tested if uncanny humanlike robots elicit death
anxiety, whether non-humanlike, canny robots can elicit death anxiety merits further study.
Robots and a Loss of Social Connection
Although future research is necessary to help confirm MacDorman’s (2005) finding that
humanlike robots elicit death salience, current research suggests that the use of caregiving robots
in institutional settings may result in effects known to increase death anxiety, such as increased
social isolation (Sharkey, 2010). In traditional elderly institutions, those in need of care often
receive social interaction through physical assistance from their caregivers, such as bathing,
fetching food and drink, assistance with cleaning, and lifting those who are bedridden (Sparrow
& Sparrow, 2006). These physical tasks are often accompanied with aspects of companionship
such as conversation (Sparrow & Sparrow, 2006). Replacing these tasks with robots may reduce
the need for specialized care workers for more physical and menial jobs but may result in
decreased caring human interaction (Sharkey, 2010). Social isolation tends to increase death
anxiety (e.g. Case & Williams, 2004), so it is imperative to understand if social robots can truly
replace this crucial human interaction. Replacing human caregivers with robots may also make
elderly persons feel objectified, unwanted, and that they have even less perceived control over
their care (Sharkey, 2010). Currently, no research has investigated the effects of specifically
caregiving robots on death anxiety, although research on the effects of caregiving robots on
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social isolation provides some support for the hypothesis that these robots increase death
salience.
Despite the possible increase in social isolation that caregiving robots bring, these kinds
of robots may be able to help empower the elderly by increasing communication and mobility,
while decreasing the need for another person in tasks like going to the bathroom (Sharkey, 2010;
Borenstein & Pearson, 2010). Research suggests that companion robots may, to a certain extent,
alleviate loneliness in nursing home patients (Banks et al., 2008). In one study, interaction with a
robotic dog improved patients’ scores on a loneliness scale compared to the control group who
received no interaction, although there was no significant difference between using a robotic dog
and a real dog (Banks et al., 2008).
The current research on the effects of using social robots in caregiving roles seems to
point to a general conclusion: robots should be used as tools to increase the quality of care and to
meet the demands of an increasing elderly population, although robots ought not to be used as
complete replacements of human caregivers.
Goals and Hypotheses of the Thesis
This thesis aims to investigate whether social robots (specifically caregiving social
robots) can fulfill the same role of acting as a source of social support and connectedness that
serves as a buffer against death anxiety while also examining whether any potential increase in
death anxiety can be explained by the robot itself eliciting death anxiety (as suggest by
MacDorman, 2005). To better understand the relationship between caregiving robots and death
anxiety, this thesis examined the differences in MS effects of non-humanlike caregiving robots
compared to a human caregiver/companion. Due to the lack of specific research on this topic, it
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remains unclear whether robots will result in increased death salience, and the results of this
thesis will help further the investigation of robots and death salience.
Based on the current understandings of how social isolation, close relationships, and
institutionalization affect death salience, it is plausible that non-humanlike robots will elicit
heightened death thought accessibility (DTA) and death-related anxieties compared to human
caregivers. Prior research suggests that viewing uncanny, non-humanlike robots produces similar
distal defenses as other MS inductions as well as evidence of DTA in a word-stem completion
task (MacDorman, 2005). This prediction is also based on research suggesting that replacing
human caregivers with robotic caregivers may lead to increased social isolation (Sharkey, 2010),
which may negatively impact the close-relationship buffer against death anxiety. Since no prior
research has investigated whether non-humanlike robots elicit death anxiety, the present thesis’s
predictions are based solely on MacDorman’s (2005), research on caregiving robots and social
isolation (Sharkey, 2010), and the anxiety-buffer hypothesis (Greenberg et al., 1986).
Self-esteem and locus of control (LoC) are also measured to observe how self-esteem and
LoC may act as moderators in robot-related death anxiety. Since terror management research
indicates that self-esteem plays an important role in buffering death anxiety (Greenberg et al.,
1992), it is plausible that participants with high levels of self-esteem are more resistant to robotinduced death anxiety, while those with low self-esteem are more vulnerable to robot-induced
death anxiety. Since it is uncertain how the robot video will serve as a MS induction, the
hypothesis for self-esteem is non-directional. For LoC, research indicates that having a more
external LoC is a significant predictor of death anxiety in older adults (Hashemi Razini et al.,
2017). Caregiving robots may exacerbate an individual’s external LoC since the user might feel
that they are not in control of how the robot behaves or they are unsure of how to use this new
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technology. Thus, someone with a more external LoC (i.e. someone who perceives their
outcomes are due to factors beyond their control), might be more susceptible to robot-induced
death anxiety. The hypothesis for LoC is non-directional because it is uncertain how robots
would serve as a MS induction.
Thus, it is predicted:
H1: Non-humanlike caregiving robots will elicit more a) death thought accessibility and b) death
anxiety compared to human caregivers.
H2: There will be a difference in a) death thought accessibility and b) death anxiety after a
mortality salience induction between participants with a high and low level of self-esteem
H3: There will be a difference in the amount of a) death thought accessibility and b) death
anxiety after MS induction between participants with an internal and external locus of control.
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Chapter 3: Method
Participants
Participants were elderly persons (N = 42) who did not have any acute cognitive
impairments. Participants had a mean age of 74.05 years with a standard deviation of 7.87 years.
The age of participants raged from 55 years to 94 years. Age, sex, race, and living situation
(independent living facility, assisted living facility, nursing home, or other) were measured for
demographics (see Appendix A). The demographics for living situation are as follows:
independent living facility – 45.2%, assisted living facility – 2.4%, other (living in private
residence) – 52.4%. For race, 95.2% of the participants were White and 4.8% were other. For
sex, 42.9% of the participants were male and 57.1% were female.
Participants were sampled from two local elder care facilities (n = 13) and online (n =
29). For participants in elder care facilities, consent was obtained from the participant (with a
clear willingness to participate) and site permission was granted from the heads of the facilities.
We collaborated with the facility workers to ensure that the participants were comfortable and
prepared for the interview process. Online participants had to first consent to participating in the
study before they could proceed to the survey. The study was reviewed and granted approval by
James Madison University’s Institutional Review Board, by way of a full-board review due to
the vulnerability of the population.
Recruitment Process
Participants at the local elder care facilities were recruited through flyers posted at the
facility (see Appendix B), research orientations which were advertised for via a section in the
facilities’ newsletters (see Appendix C), and through a “Tech Faire” (see Appendix D). For
flyers, participants were able to contact the researcher directly via phone or email to arrange a
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time to participate. Individuals at the research orientations were given a presentation on
caregiving robots and were given more information about the study. After the orientation,
participants could sign up for a time to participate in the study. At the “Tech Faire” the
researcher had a poster giving information about caregiving robots and the study, and individuals
interested in participating could sign up for the study.
Participants were also recruited online through posts on Facebook, Twitter, and various
church and synagogue listservs (see Appendix E for an example post). The researcher also
encouraged other lab members to share the information about the study on their social media and
with their friends and family.
Materials
Independent Variables
The main independent variable was the type of caregiver (non-humanlike caregiving
robot or human caregiver). Self-esteem and LoC were measured as covariates.
Videos. Participants viewed a short video that was either the robot MS induction video or
the human caregiver control video (see Appendix F). The robot condition was a video of two
robots, Lio and Guido, that were developed by F&P Personal Robotics. The video showed Lio
and Guido supporting elderly people throughout their day in their homes.
The control condition was a video of a human caregiver. The video showed various
caregiving activities (e.g. bathing, helping with medication) in a “day in the life” of a caregiver.
The video was created by the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP).
Self-esteem. Self-esteem was assessed using Rosenberg’s Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg,
1965) (see Appendix G). The scale has 10 items and measures global self-worth by measuring
positive and negative self-evaluations such as “On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.” The
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scale is uni-dimensional, and all of the items are answered using a 4-point Likert Scale ranging
from strongly agree to strongly disagree. The scores on the 10 items are summed, and the higher
the score, the higher the self-esteem. The scale produced an alpha of .78 in the present study.
Locus of Control. Rotter’s Locus of Control Scale (1966) (see Appendix H) was used to
measure LoC. This scale measures the extent to which individuals believe they can control
events and outcomes in their lives (Rotter, 1966). This is a 29-item, forced-choice scale with
questions such as “many of the unhappy things in people's lives are partly due to bad luck or
“people's misfortunes result from the mistakes they make.” The non-filler items are then summed
(items 1, 8, 14, 19, 24, and 27 are fillers). A high score indicates an external LoC and a low score
indicates an internal LoC. The scale produced an alpha of .97 in the present study.
Dependent Variables
The primary dependent variables were death thought accessibility (DTA) and death
anxiety.
Death Thought Accessibility. To assess DTA, participants completed a word stem
completion task created by Greenberg, Pyszczynski, and Solomon (1986) (see Appendix I).
Participants were asked to complete 25 word stems such as “BUR _ _”. Each questionnaire
contained 6 possible death-related words. The summed number of death salient words for each
participant served as a MS manipulation check.
Death Anxiety. Death anxiety was measured using Thorson and Powell’s (1992) Revised
Death Anxiety Scale (RDAS) (see Appendix J), a 25-item questionnaire containing questions
regarding the individual’s feelings and thoughts about death such as “I fear dying a painful
death.” Each item is answered on a 6-point Likert Scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to
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“strongly agree.” A higher summed score indicates a higher level of death anxiety. The scale
produced an alpha of .89 in the present study.
Procedure
In-person participants were randomly assigned to either the robot experimental condition
or the control condition. Participants first completed Rosenberg’s Self Esteem Scale
questionnaire and Rotter’s Locus of Control Scale. For the self-esteem and LoC scales, the
participant received a paper copy of the questionnaire to fill out while a trained interviewer read
the questions aloud. Participants then watched their assigned video on an iPad provided by the
interviewer. After the video, participants completed the word search puzzle as a delay (see
Appendix K) before moving on to the word stem completion task that served as a manipulation
check. The participant completed the delay task and the word stem completion task on paper
while the interviewer read the questions aloud. Next, participants completed the RDAS to assess
his/her level of death anxiety. Finally, participants answered demographic questions for their
age, sex, race, and living situation. For the RDAS and the demographic questions, the participant
filled out a paper copy of the questionnaire while the interviewer read the questions aloud. The
interviewer then debriefed the participants and gave participants the option of contacting the
researcher if they had future questions. For the online version, participants completed the survey,
which was designed using Qualtrics, an online survey tool. The online survey was completed in
the same order as the in-person survey. Participants completed the survey on their computer and
at the time of their choosing. The data was analyzed using SPSS.
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Chapter 4: Results
Hypothesis 1
The first hypothesis predicted that non-humanlike caregiving robots will elicit more a)
DTA and b) death anxiety compared to human caregivers. For DTA, an independent samples ttest was run to test the differences between the experimental (M = 1.50, SD = .86) and control (M
= 1.55, SD = .89) groups; t(40) = -.19, p = .864. For death anxiety, an independent samples t-test
was run to test the differences between the experimental (M = 3.19, SD = .87) and control (M =
3.50, SD = .77) groups; t(39) = -1.22, p = .229. While the same pattern was seen in both DTA
and death anxiety, H1 was not supported. Differences in degrees of freedom are due to
participants not completing all the questions.
Hypothesis 2
The second hypothesis predicted there would be a difference in a) DTA and b)
death anxiety after the MS induction between participants with a high and low level of selfesteem. Self-esteem was dichotomized; 0.00-2.76 served as a low self-esteem score, and 2.774.00 served as a high self-esteem score. A one-way ANOVA was used to test Hypothesis 2. For
DTA, F (3, 41) = .24, p = .63, R2 = -.001. For death anxiety, F(3, 40) = 5.78, p = .511, R2 = .26.
Differences in the degrees of freedom are due to a participant dropping out.
Hypothesis 3
The third hypothesis predicted there would be a difference in the amount of a) DTA and
b) death anxiety after the MS induction between participants with an internal and external LoC.
LoC was dichotomized; 4.00-9.66 served as a low (internal) LoC score, and 9.67-17.00 served as
a high (external) LoC score. A one-way ANOVA was used to test Hypothesis 3. For DTA, F (3,
40) = .05, p = -.07, R2 = .007. For LoC, F(3,40) = 1.60, p = .551, R2 = .04.
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Chapter 5: General Discussion and Conclusions
Hypothesis 1
The first hypothesis predicted that non-humanlike caregiving robots will elicit more a)
DTA and b) death anxiety compared to human caregivers. There was no significant difference in
DTA and death anxiety between the experimental robot condition and the human control
condition. Though the results were not significant, the means for both DTA and death anxiety
were higher in the human condition compared to the robot condition, something that is both
interesting and unexpected. Despite the lack of significance, the fact that the means for both
DTA and death anxiety leaned toward the human caregiver suggests there may be some kind of
relationship between the type of caregiver and death-related cognitions. The lack of significance
may be due to the small sample size, thus leading to low statistical power. The researcher has
identified three possible explanations for why the human video elicited more DTA and death
anxiety compared to the robot video.
First, the human video shows elderly persons who are frailer and sicker than the elderly
persons in the robot video. The frailness/sickness may have served as a reminder of death, thus
causing DTA and death anxiety. Research suggests that ageism and self-ageism (i.e. negative
attitudes toward elderly persons when the individual is themselves elderly) derives from
existential threats (Martens et al., 2005). Viewing an elderly person reminds one of the
inescapability of their death, as well as reminding them that the body is fallible and the means by
which we manage death anxiety (e.g. self-esteem) is not permanent (Martens et al., 2005). Since
aging is the process by which individuals get closer to death, those closest to death, the elderly,
serve as direct reminders of mortality (Martens et al., 2005). In their study, Martens and
colleagues (2005) found that negative attitudes toward the elderly after a MS induction are a
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function of the similarity between oneself and an elderly individual. Though the study looked at
the similarity between non-elderly and elderly individuals, it is plausible that elderly individuals
(who are indeed very similar to other elderly individuals) exhibit the same negative attitudes
toward other elderly persons under MS conditions. Additionally, older adults are more likely to
negatively view adults who are older and more disabled than themselves (Dobbs et al., 2008). In
this thesis, the human caregiver video showed elderly individuals receiving high degrees of care
(e.g. being dressed by a caregiver, being fed by a caregiver), whereas the robot video showed
more independent and active elderly individuals. Thus, it is likely that the chosen human video
elicited death anxiety and DTA either to a much higher degree than the robot video or elicited
death anxiety and DTA while the robot video did not.
Second, it is possible that unlike uncanny, humanlike robots, non-humanlike robots (i.e.
the robot in Video 1) do not elicit DTA or death anxiety. If this is true, then this thesis only
supports this conclusion for visual displays of robots, and it remains unclear if physically
interacting with a robot elicits death anxiety. Additionally, this thesis serves as an important
quasi-reproduction of MacDorman’s (2005) study. Whereas MacDorman (2005) used uncanny,
eerie robots, this thesis used canny, non-humanlike robots that are not thought to produce
feelings of eeriness (Mori, 1970). Given this distinction, it is important to note that the present
thesis is not an exact replication of MacDorman’s (2005) study, rather it aims to apply elements
of MacDorman’s methodology and theory to caregiving robots. Additionally, MacDorman’s
(2005) study used worldview adherence as a distal measure of death anxiety instead of a death
anxiety scale like the one used in this thesis. In juxtaposition to MacDorman (2005), the results
of this thesis indicate that non-humanlike robots may not serve as reminders of death, at least in
the sense of not appearing like dead humans thus conveying the idea that an individual will
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someday die. Future research is necessary to examine if robots elicit death anxiety for other
reasons such as by creating a fear of being replaced, a fear of social isolation, or by failing to
buffer close-relationship-related death anxiety.
Last, and perhaps most interesting, many anti-robot elderly persons declined to
participate in the study. In various in-person recruitment attempts, multiple individuals expressed
initial interest in the study but refused to support robot research or anything promoting the use of
robots. However, this may be due to miscommunications about the intent of the research (i.e.
mistakenly believing the researcher was trying to sell the individual a robot). In general, this
apparent disdain for robots in some elderly individuals suggests that there may be some
underlying anxiety about robots. Individuals who agreed to participate in the study typically
expressed more positive attitudes toward robots or technology in general. Perhaps more prorobot individuals do not have robot-related anxiety, thus causing the MS manipulation to fail.
Also, perhaps these individuals would prefer to be cared for by a robot rather than a human
caregiver, thus contributing to lower death anxiety in the robot condition. Finally, it is possible
that the lack of robot-related anxiety in combination with the human video eliciting DTA and
death anxiety contributed to the surprising findings. Nevertheless, this interesting distinction
between pro- and anti-robot elderly individuals warrants further study, especially if caregiving
robots are becoming more popular in elder care facilities.
Hypothesis 2
The second hypothesis predicted that there would be a difference in a) DTA and b)
death anxiety after a MS induction between participants with a high and low level of self-esteem.
That is, participants with low self-esteem would exhibit a different amount of DTA and death
anxiety after a MS induction compared to participants with high self-esteem. The study found no
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significant interactions between self-esteem and the experimental condition. This may be
because non-human robots do not elicit death anxiety, or the chosen robot video was not a strong
enough MS induction to elicit death anxiety, so participant self-esteem made no difference in
death anxiety.
Another possible explanation is that being cared for by a robot does not affect self-esteem
in the same the way being cared for by a younger, more able human caregiver may affect selfesteem. This may be because a robot caregiver does not evoke the same temporal comparison
and/or social comparison as does a human caregiver and/or because the individuals in the robot
video did not serve as a threat to one’s self-esteem. Temporal comparison refers to the process
by which an individual compares themselves to, and evaluates themselves against themselves at
two different points in time (Albert, 1997). Social comparison refers to the process by which an
individual compares themselves to and evaluates themselves against another individual
(Festinger, 1954). In the case of the human caregiver video, witnessing the younger, more able
person care an elderly person may have evoked a temporal or social comparison (e.g. “I
remember when I could help someone else like that” or “that person needs just as much help as I
do”), while the robot video did not evoke such comparisons. In turn, these comparisons may
evoke negative attitudes toward the self (Albert, 1997; Festinger, 1954), thus leading to a
decrease in self-esteem. This is possible based on the idea that similarity is a key feature in the
comparison process (Martens et al., 2005). In the case of a non-humanlike robot, there may not
be enough of a similarity between the individual and the robot to evoke a temporal or social
comparison, though future research is necessary to test this idea. If the robot video did not evoke
a temporal or social comparison, then no negative comparison-based evaluations of the self could
be made. Since self-esteem functions as a buffer against death anxiety (Greenberg et al., 1992), if
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the robot caregiver did evoke death anxiety, we would expect participants with higher levels of
self-esteem to be less susceptible to this temporal or social comparison process while participants
with low self-esteem would be more susceptible to this comparison. Thus, participants with low
self-esteem would be more likely to make negative self-evaluations, resulting in an inability to
buffer against robot-induced death anxiety. However, if non-humanlike robots do not evoke
these comparisons, then differences in self-esteem would not affect death anxiety. In this
explanation, self-esteem did not moderate robot-induced death anxiety because the robot did not
foster any cognitions in which self-esteem was relevant.
Hypothesis 3
The third hypothesis predicted that there would be a difference in the amount of a) DTA
and b) death anxiety after the MS induction between participants with an internal and external
LoC. In other words, participants with an external LoC would display different levels of DTA
and death anxiety after a MS induction compared to participants with an internal LoC. Contrary
to the prediction, there were no significant interactions between LoC and the experimental
condition. Like with self-esteem, this may be because non-human robots do not elicit death
anxiety, or the chosen robot video was not a strong enough MS induction to elicit death anxiety,
so participant LoC made no difference in death anxiety.
It is also possible that watching a video of a caregiving robot (as opposed to actually
interacting with one) did not strongly enough express the potential challenges of using a robotic
caregiver. This is relevant because using a robotic caregiver may be more anxiety-provoking for
someone with a more external LoC compared to someone with a more internal LoC. In turn, a
more external LoC may lead to higher levels of death anxiety (Hashemi Razini et al., 2017).
Since the chosen robot video was likely designed as a promotional video, the video showcased
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the user easily interacting with the robot. It is plausible that the daily, actual use of a caregiving
robot would involve technological difficulties and accessibility concerns, especially for older
adults who are more likely than younger adults to need help when using new technology and
who are less confident than younger adults in their technology use (Anderson & Perrin, 2017).
Accessibility concerns include worries about a lack of knowledge to use the robot and concerns
that the technology is too complex to use or learn to use (Young et al. 2009). However, robotic
caregivers may also help users feel more in control and empowered by allowing the user to
engage in tasks they would otherwise need another person for, such as going to the bathroom or
bathing (Sharkey, 2010). Regardless of whether robotic caregivers actually contribute to a more
external or internal LoC (which future research is necessary for figuring out), the video of the
robot likely did not facilitate concerns related to LoC (video limitations are discussed further in
the “Limitations” section). If this is the case, then it makes sense that participant LoC did not
play an important role in moderating death anxiety. Future research involving actual humanrobot interaction is necessary for investigating this further.
Living Situation May Affect Death Anxiety
During data analysis, it occurred to us that since participants ended up being recruited
from places besides the two independent living facilities, living situation might have affected
death anxiety. A between-subjects ANOVA showed significant differences between living
situation and death anxiety; F(2, 40) = 13.68, p<.05, R2 = .39. The study found that those living
in private residencies (M = 3.84, SD = .65) had the highest death anxiety followed by those
living in independent living (M = 2.82, SD = .65) and assisted living (M = 2.32). Note that this
death anxiety was not directly related to the experimental manipulation.
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These results may have occurred because those living in facilities have more immediate
care available to them, and thus the threat of death/dying is less prevalent. Additionally, older
people tend to live in facilities with increasing degrees of care, and older elderly people
traditionally have less death anxiety compared to younger elderly people (Fornter & Neimeyer,
1999; Bengtson et al., 1977; Neimeyer, Wittkowski, & Moser, 2003). It is plausible that the
combination of heightened care in independent and assisted living facilities and the increased age
for individuals in these facilities contributed to these results. It is also important to consider that
only one participant reported living in an assisted living facility, thus limiting the sample size.
Another consideration is that those living in private residencies may vary in their specific living
situation. For instance, a participant could be living by themselves, with a spouse, or with their
family. Living with a spouse or family provides a close relationship, which serves as a buffer
against death anxiety by alleviating the anxiety and boosting self-esteem (Florian et al., 2002)
(though someone may also live with a spouse or other family at a facility). Living by oneself
(and in lieu of other close relationships such as close friends) may contribute to higher levels of
death anxiety without close relationships to serve as a buffer (Florian et al., 2002).
This is an interesting finding because some literature suggests that living in an elder care
facility increases death anxiety due to being around death and increased social isolation (Azaiza
et al., 2010). However, another study (Moreno et al., 2008) found lower death anxiety for those
in institutions, presumably due to the older age of individuals living in institutions and increased
degree of care. Evidently, the relationship between death anxiety and the institutionalized elderly
is complex and various factors go into determining how living in an elder care facility affects
death anxiety.
Limitations
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Videos. One of the major limitations in the study was the use of videos as the
experimental manipulation and control. Since the videos were not self-produced, but rather were
found on YouTube, the videos contained confounding variables such as varying actions
performed by the caregiver, the elderly person being cared for, the language in the videos, and
the music in the videos. The researcher attempted to choose similar videos, especially in terms of
general content and length of the video, but many factors could not be controlled for. It is
possible that any one or more of these factors could have affected participant responses. For
example, the high degree of fragility of elderly persons in the control video (see “Hypothesis 1”
in the discussion section for more information). Additionally, the results only reflect viewing a
robot or human caregiver with an elderly person, not the actual use of a robot or human
caregiver. It may be the case that interacting with a robot or human may produce different
degrees of death anxiety. Also, being cared for on a daily basis for an extended period of time by
the given caregiver may produce different results. It is important that future research examine the
actual and extended use of robotic caregivers.
Participant bias. Based on observations from the in-person data collection, many of the
participants expressed more pro-robot and/or pro-technology attitudes compared to individuals
who declined to participate in the study, as discussed earlier. The apparent bias in participants
may have caused a biased, non-random sample. Thus, the results of this thesis are not likely a
representative sample of the elderly. A larger sample size may have mitigated this concern by
capturing a representative distribution of the population in question.
Demographics. Most participants (95.2%) were White. Some research suggests that
while race is not a main predictor of death anxiety, determinants of death anxiety vary by race
(Assari & Moghani Lankarani, 2016). For example, Assari and Moghani Lankarani (2016) found
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that self-rated health and perceived control over life are associated with death anxiety for White
but not Black elderly individuals. Another study suggests that elderly White individuals have
more fear about the dying process whereas elderly Black individuals have more fear about what
comes after death (Depaola et al., 2003). The study also posits that the differences in one’s
culture that come with differences in one’s race may contribute to the differences in death
concerns (Depaola et al., 2003). Given the lack of variability of participant race, the results may
differ from other races.
Sample size. The relatively small sample size (N = 42) is another limitation of the study.
A larger sample size may have given a greater ability to detect significant differences. In general,
finding participants was quite difficult. The researcher was only able to recruit from two
independent living facilities, and individuals in the facilities often declined to participate. It
seemed that some potential participants were wary that the researcher was trying sell them a
robot or they did not want to support robot-related research. While these apparent anti-robot
attitudes made it difficult to find participants, it does suggest some interesting underlying anxiety
that some elderly people have about robots, and that individual differences may affect attitudes
toward robots. Other potential participants declined to participate due to the time commitment or
they were not physical well enough to participate. Due to the lack of interest at the facilities, the
researcher brought the study online and shared it via social media and listservs. While this was
more successful than in-person data collection, it was still extremely difficult to recruit
participants.
Theoretical Implications
This thesis has interesting theoretical implications for TMT. First, robots may have a
unique effect on death-related thoughts and anxieties, specifically among the elderly. Though
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this study did not look at how the elderly perceive robots in general, it appears that some elderly
persons show signs of anxiety when thinking about robots. The observation that only some
elderly persons show signs of robot-related anxiety suggests that individual differences play an
important role in this anxiety. Second, it remains unclear whether all robots serve as reminders of
death, and it is plausible that only uncanny, humanlike robots serve as death reminders, while
non-humanlike robots do not. It also remains unclear whether being cared for by a robot or living
with a social robot, in general, affects the close-relationship buffer against death anxiety and how
living with and being cared for by a robot affects self-esteem. This thesis and MacDorman
(2005) introduce a new facet of terror management research that warrants further study,
especially as robotic technologies become more popular in the workplace, healthcare, and social
settings.
Future Research
There remains much to be explored regarding robots and death anxiety. While the results
of this thesis and similar studies do not conclusively show if robots affect death anxiety, future
research on long-term use of a caregiving robot is crucial for further understanding this buffer.
The use of general companion robots (for the elderly or any age) ought also to be studied in this
close-relationship context. If robots are standing in for human social relationships, it is important
to know if robots can fulfill the same need for belonging and self-esteem as humans.
It would also be beneficial to study how robots in non-social settings affect death-related
anxieties. For example, as robots become more popular in industrial and manufacturing settings,
thus replacing human workers, how does this affect the death anxiety of these workers? As
MacDorman (2005) suggests, the fear of being replaced may contribute to death anxiety. This
line of research extends toward jobs in healthcare, especially for workers in caregiving roles.
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Replacing human caregivers with robots may affect how nurses and other caregiving workers
view themselves and produce a similar fear of being replaced.
Given the limited demographic variability in this thesis, future research should examine
the use of caregiving robots with more diverse populations as well as with populations not living
in the United States. It would be especially interesting to compare attitudes towards caregiving
robots between individuals living in areas where caregiving robots are not common and
individuals living in areas where caregiving robots are more popular and mainstream (e.g.
Japan). This research might help explore how differences in culture, elder care practices, and
attitudes toward technology affect robot-related anxieties.
Conclusions
A terror management approach in Human-Robot Interaction (HRI) provides an
interesting view of how interacting with this increasingly popular technology affects the
omnipresent fear of death. The use of TMT in the study of caregiving robots for the elderly is
especially important considering that the institutionalized elderly are potentially at a higher risk
for death anxiety than their non-institutionalized counterpart. Though this thesis did not find a
significant effect of caregiving robots on death anxiety, past research (i.e. MacDorman, 2005,
Sharkey, 2010) suggests that robots may increase death anxiety and lead to social isolation.
Furthermore, the researcher’s interactions with potential participants point towards underlying
robot-related anxiety. Future HRI research should consider looking at interactions from a terror
management perspective, and future terror management research should further the investigation
of robots and existential concerns.
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Appendix A: Demographics
Please answer the following questions:
1. What is your age in years? _______

2. What is your sex? (please check one)
_____ Male

_____ Female

3. What is your ethnicity? (please check one)
_____ White/Caucasian
_____ Hispanic or Latino
_____ Black or African American
_____ Native American or American Indian
_____ Asian/Pacific Islander
_____ Other (please specify)

4. What term best describes your current living situation? (please check one)
_____ Independent living facility
_____ Assisted living facility
_____ Nursing home
_____ Other (please specify)
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Appendix B: Recruitment Flyer
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Appendix C: Newsletter

Robots as Caregivers Research Orientation
Date
Presented by researchers Mira Gruber and Dr. Lindsey Harvell-Bowman, James Madison
University Department of Psychology
Would you be okay with a robot living with you? Would you talk to the robot? What if the robot
administered your medication or took your vitals? We are interested in what you think! To meet
the increasing demand for caregivers, robots are being implemented in elder care facilities to
assist with daily tasks and to provide companionship. And, we want to know how you feel about
that! If you are interested in participating in our research and/or want to learn more, please attend
this orientation session and/or if you would like to participate in the research, please contact Mira
Gruber via email at gruberme@dukes.jmu.edu or phone: 571-334-6702.
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Appendix D: Tech Faire Poster

45

Appendix E: Social Media Recruitment
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Appendix F: Videos
Experimental condition/Non-humanlike robot: https://youtu.be/Z-DEFDjOBVc
Control condition/human caregiver: https://youtu.be/bs_7jWqSeIM
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Appendix G: Rosenberg’s Self-Esteem Scale
Instructions: Below is a list of statements dealing with your general feelings about yourself. If
you strongly agree, circle SA. If you agree with the statement, circle A. If you disagree, circle D.
If you strongly disagree, circle SD.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.
At times, I think I am no good at all.
I feel that I have a number of good qualities.
I am able to do things as well as most other people.
I feel I do not have much to be proud of.
I certainly feel useless at times.
I feel that I’m a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with
others.
I wish I could have more respect for myself.
All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.
I take a positive attitude toward myself.
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SA
SA
SA
SA
SA
SA
SA

A
A
A
A
A
A
A

D
D
D
D
D
D
D

SD
SD
SD
SD
SD
SD
SD

SA A
SA A
SA A

D
D
D

SD
SD
SD

Appendix H: Locus of Control Scale
Rotter's Locus of Control Scale
For each question select the statement that you agree with the most
1.

a. Children get into trouble because their patents punish them too much.
b. The trouble with most children nowadays is that their parents are too easy with them.

2.

a. Many of the unhappy things in people's lives are partly due to bad luck.
b. People's misfortunes result from the mistakes they make.

3.

a. One of the major reasons why we have wars is because people don't take enough
interest in politics.
b. There will always be wars, no matter how hard people try to prevent them.

4.

a. In the long run people get the respect they deserve in this world
b. Unfortunately, an individual's worth often passes unrecognized no matter how hard he
tries

5.

a. The idea that teachers are unfair to students is nonsense.
b. Most students don't realize the extent to which their grades are influenced by
accidental happenings.

6.

a. Without the right breaks one cannot be an effective leader.
b. Capable people who fail to become leaders have not taken advantage of their
opportunities.

7.

a. No matter how hard you try some people just don't like you.
b. People who can't get others to like them don't understand how to get along with others.

8.

a. Heredity plays the major role in determining one's personality
b. It is one's experiences in life which determine what they're like.

9.

a. I have often found that what is going to happen will happen.
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b. Trusting to fate has never turned out as well for me as making a decision to take a
definite course of action.
10.

a. In the case of the well prepared student there is rarely if ever such a thing as an unfair
test.
b. Many times exam questions tend to be so unrelated to coursework that studying in
really useless.

11.

a. Becoming a success is a matter of hard work, luck has little or nothing to do with it.
b. Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the right place at the right time.

12.

a. The average citizen can have an influence in government decisions.
b. This world is run by the few people in power, and there is not much the little guy can
do about it.

13.

a. When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can make them work.
b. It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many things turn out to-be a matter
of good or bad fortune anyhow.

14.

a. There are certain people who are just no good.
b. There is some good in everybody.

15.

a. In my case getting what I want has little or nothing to do with luck.
b. Many times we might just as well decide what to do by flipping a coin.

16.

a. Who gets to be the boss often depends on who was lucky enough to be in the right
place first.
b. Getting people to do the right thing depends upon ability. Luck has little or nothing to
do with it.

17.

a. As far as world affairs are concerned, most of us are the victims of forces we can
neither understand, nor control.
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b. By taking an active part in political and social affairs the people can control world
events.
18.

a. Most people don't realize the extent to which their lives are controlled by accidental
happenings.
b. There really is no such thing as "luck."

19.

a. One should always be willing to admit mistakes.
b. It is usually best to cover up one's mistakes.

20.

a. It is hard to know whether or not a person really likes you.
b. How many friends you have depends upon how nice a person you are.

21.

a. In the long run the bad things that happen to us are balanced by the good ones.
b. Most misfortunes are the result of lack of ability, ignorance, laziness, or all three.

22.

a. With enough effort we can wipe out political corruption.
b. It is difficult for people to have much control over the things politicians do in office.

23.

a. Sometimes I can't understand how teachers arrive at the grades they give.
b. There is a direct connection between how hard 1 study and the grades I get.

24.

a. A good leader expects people to decide for themselves what they should do.
b. A good leader makes it clear to everybody what their jobs are.

25.

a. Many times I feel that I have little influence over the things that happen to me.
b. It is impossible for me to believe that chance or luck plays an important role in my
life.

26.

a. People are lonely because they don't try to be friendly.
b. There's not much use in trying too hard to please people, if they like you, they like
you.

27.

a. There is too much emphasis on athletics in high school.
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b. Team sports are an excellent way to build character.
28.

a. What happens to me is my own doing.
b. Sometimes I feel that I don't have enough control over the direction my life is taking.

29.

a. Most of the time I can't understand why politicians behave the way they do.
b. In the long run the people are responsible for bad government on a national as well as
on a local level.
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Appendix I: Word Stem Completion Task
We are interested in seeing how well you can complete word stems. Please complete the
following by filling letters in the blanks to create words. Please fill in the blanks with the first
word that comes to mind. Write one letter per blank. Some words may be plural. Thank you.

1. BUR _ _ D

14. CHA _ _

2. PLA _ _

15. KI _ _ ED

3. _ _ OK

16. CL _ _ K

4. WAT _ _

17. TAB _ _

5. DE _ _

18. W _ _ DOW

6. MU _ _

19. SK _ _ L

7. _ _ NG

20. TR _ _

8. B _ T _ LE

21. P _ P _ R

9. M_ J _ R

22. COFF _ _

10. P _ _ TURE

23. _ O _ SE

11. FL _ W _ R

24. POST _ _

12. GRA _ _

25. R _ DI _

13. K _ _GS
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Appendix J: Death Anxiety Scale
We are interested in your feelings and thoughts about death and things associated with death.
Please circle the number that best fits how you think or feel about the following statements. It is
important that you are honest in your answers.
1. I fear dying a painful death.
0

1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

2. Not knowing what the next world is like troubles me.
0

1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

3. The idea of never thinking again after I die frightens me.
0

1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

4. I am not at all anxious about what happens to the body after burial.
0

1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

5. Coffins make me anxious.
0

1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

6. I hate to think about losing control over my affairs after I am gone.
0

1

2

3
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4

5

Strongly Disagree

Strongly Agree

7. Being totally immobile after death bothers me.
0

1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

8. I dread to think about having an operation.
0

1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

9. The subject of life after death troubles me greatly.
0

1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

10. I am not afraid of a long, slow dying.
0

1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

11. I do not mind the idea of being shut into a coffin when I die.
0

1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

12. I hate the idea that I will be helpless after I die.
0

1

2

3

Strongly Disagree

4

5
Strongly Agree
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13. I am not at all concerned over whether or not there is an afterlife.
0

1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

14. Never feeling anything again after I die upsets me.
0

1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

15. The pain involved in dying frightens me.
0

1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

16. I am looking forward to new life after I die.
0

1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

17. I am not worried about ever being helpless.
0

1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

18. I am not troubled by the thought that my body will decompose in the grave.
0

1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

19. The feeling that I will be missing out on so much after I die disturbs me.
0

1

2

3
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4

5

Strongly Disagree

Strongly Agree

20. I am worried about what happens to us after we die.
0

1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

21. I am not at all concerned with being in control of things.
0

1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

22. The total isolation of death is frightening to me.
0

1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

23. I am not particularly afraid of getting cancer.
0

1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

24. I will leave careful instructions about how things should be done after I am gone.
0

1

2

3

4

Strongly Disagree

5
Strongly Agree

25. What happens to my body after I die does not bother me.
0

1

2

3

Strongly Disagree

4

5
Strongly Agree
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Appendix K: Delay Task
Word Search Puzzle
Circle as many words as you can in the puzzle below.
Book
Desk
Movie
Paper
Grass
Music
S
W
A
B
B
R
E
P
A
P

R
P
M
T
M
F
L
A
G
S

Computer
Phone
Train
School
Beer
Actor
E
H
U
N
R
O
G
N
T
C

T
O
S
R
K
A
V
U
A
H

U
N
I
O
S
G
I
I
B
O

P
E
C
T
E
O
Z
N
E
O

M
R
P
C
D
L
B
E
T
L

O
E
Z
A
E
B
O
L
G
N
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C
E
S
S
A
R
G
W
D
I

O
B
N
K
O
O
B
Q
O
T
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